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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
0. I\::. l'LA Y, ~\dministrator of the
E~tate of ~lrnold ICartchner, also
known as Arnold G. ICartchner, and
~lrnold Grant Kartchner, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v~.

Case No.
7705

STEPHEX L. DrXFORD, PAUL H.
STEYEXS, BrRNS L. DUNFORD
and L. CLAYTON DUNFORD,
djbja The Dunford Bread Co.,
Defendants and Respondents.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Defendants and respondents petition this Honorable
Court for a rehearing in the above entitled case for the
following grounds and reasons :
1. This Honorable Court failed to pass upon and
determine all questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to the final deterInination of the case contrary to the provisions of Rule
76 (a) U.R.C.P.
2. This Honorable Court erred in holding that the
instruction on assumption of risk was prejudicial error.
3. This Honorable Court ·erred in failing to hold
that there was no evidence in the record to warrant a
finding that any negligence upon the part of the defen-
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dants' driver was the proximate cause of the accident.
4. This Honorable Court erred in failing to hold
that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law barring any recovery in this action.
WHEREFORE, respondents pray that this Court
make and enter an order setting aside the opinion and
decision of this Court, made and filed on the 24th day of
January, 1952, and that it order a rehearing of the above
entitled case, and upon rehearing that it make and enter
its order affirming the judgment of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN &
CHRISTENSEN,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In filing this petition for rehearing we are fully
cognizant that petitions for rehearing are granted with
reluctance and only when the Court is convinced that
some salient point has been o:verlooked or that it has
committed serious error. We realize that the Court can
never convince losing counsel that he is not entitled to
prevail. Likewise we realize that the Court does not
have the time to decide every case twice. We are in full
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sympathy with the rule which denies a rehearing except
in the 1uost tmusual case. It is not our practice to file
petitions for rehearing, and this petition is filed and
urged upon the Court only in the sincere belief that the
Court has fallen into grave error, and that the Court
has con1pletely overlooked and wholly failed to consider
two very important points raised by the respondents in
their original brief. \Vith these considerations in mind
we proceed to a discussion of the various points upon
which our petition is based.
POINT I.
_~

THIS COURT FAILED TO PASS UPON AND DETERMINE ALL QUESTIONS OF LAW INVOLVED IN THE CASE
PRESENTED UPON THE APPEAL AND NECESSARY TO
THE FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE CASE, CONTRARY
TO THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 76 (a) U.R.C.P.

Rule 76 (a) U.R.C.P. provides in part as follows:
"If a new trial is granted the Court shall
pass upon and determine all questions of law
involved in the case presented upon the appeal
and necessary to the final determination of the
case." (Italics ours).
The reason for this rule is obvious. Where several
points of law are presented upon appeal, and the Court
determines that a new trial should be granted because
of prejudicial error occurring at the first trial, it is to
the advantage of both parties as well as to both the trial
court and the appellate court that all questions of law
be laid to rest at one time. Failure of the Court to rule
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upon all questions of law presented will result In the
probability of the same questions being presented in a
subsequent appeal of the same case. This is costly in
both time and money to litigants and costly also in the
time of the court.
In the case at bar, this Court has apparently overlooked the provisions of this rule. Three points were
raised by the appellant upon his appeal and two additional points were raised by the respondents in their
brief. All of thes.e issues of law must be resolved, in
order that this case may be finally determined. Under
the rule above quoted, both parties are entitled to have
these issues determined at this time by this Court. Failure upon the part of the Court to determine these questions at this time will give rise to the definite possibility
of a subsequent appeal by one party or the other involving the same questions. The undesirability of this we
think will be readily apparent to the Court.
In his brief on appeal appellant relied upon three
points: First, appellant complained of the Court's instruction on assumption of risk. This issue, and this
issue only, this Court determined.
Second, appellant complained of the Court's instruction on contributory negligence. While appellant did not
question that the respondents were entitled to an instruction on contributory negligence, he did urge that
the instruction given did not correctly state the law and
was too favorable to the respondents. Both parties to
this action are entitled to a ruling from this Court as
to the correctness of this instruction, since the matter
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will undoubtedly be presented in a retrial of the case.
If the instruction correctly stated the law then the respondent is entitled to have the same instruction given
at the retrial of this action. On the other hand, if the
instruction does not correctly state the law this Court
should point out wherein it is deficient so that the trial
court can properly instruct the jury when the case is
again tried.
Third, appellant also complained that the Court
failed to give an instruction requested by him. If the
appellant was entitled to such an instruction this Court
should so declare so that the trial judge will be properly
guided in considering requests for instructions at the
second trial. Contrariwise if the appellant was not
entitled to such an instruction this Court should so
declare so that the trial judge will not be led into error
by any similar request that may be made by appellant
at the retrial.
Besides the points raised by the appellant in his
brief the respondent raised two additional points as
grounds for affirmance of the judgment. In view of the
fact that this court reversed the judgment of the trial
court, there is an implied holding that these points were
without merit. However, there is nothing in either the
prevailing opinion, written by Mr. Justice Henriod, or in
the concurring opinion, written by Chief Justice Wolfe,
which indicates that the two points raised by respondent
were even considered by the Court. These two points
will be fully discussed in a subsequent portion of our
brief so we shall not dwell upon them here. Suffice it
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to say that the Court has failed to consider and determine all of the issues of law presented by the parties,
and unless those issues are now determined by the Court
there is a very good possibility that both parties will
be put to additional time and expense in relitigation of
the very same questions which the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure specifically declare must be determined at
this time.
POINT II.
THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE INSTRUCTION ON ASSUMPTION OF RISK WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

In its decision this Court held that the trial Court's
instruction on assumption of risk was prejudicial error,
and on this ground the Court reversed the judgment
below and ordered a new trial. On this petition for rehearing we do not ask the court to review its holding
that the giving of such an instruction was technical error.
However, we do believe, and we do now contend that
the error was purely technical and could not have resulted in any prejudice to the appellant. We· think there
can he no question as to the correctness of the instruction,
as an abstract proposition of law. It was taken practically verbatim from a well recognized and frequently
quoted text book. 38 Am. J ur. 856; Negligence, Sec. 171.
The instruction would have been an equally correct statement of law had the second paragraph been worded to
read as follows:
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"If you find frmn the evidence in this case
that the deceased, Arnold Kartchner, placed himself in a position of obvious peril when there was
no reasonable justification therefor, then the said
~\rnold Kartchner is deemed to have been guilty
of contributory negligence, and your verdict must
be in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff no cause of action."
The suggested amendinent to the instruction merely
changes the technical designation of the defense from
that of assumption of risk to that of contributory negligence. It could make no difference to the jury what
appellation the Court applied to the defense. If there
was evidence to support the premises upon which the
instruction was based, and the same legal result would
follow regardless of the name applied to the defense,
any technical error would be wholly immaterial and
harmless.
That the deceased placed himself in a position of
obvious peril would seem to be too clear to admit of any
dispute. At the time deceased alighted from his station
wagon the defendant's truck was closely approaching
on the right hand side of the road, and its presence was
perfectly obvious to anyone who looked. There is nothing in the record to indicate that there was any reason
or excuse whatsoever for the deceased to alight on the
left hand side toward the 13th South traffic. So far as
the record shows, he could have, with equal facility and
much greater safety, alighted from the right hand side
of his station wagon and onto the sidewalk. That it is
contributory negligence for a peTson to step from a place
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of safety directly into the path of approaching traffic
is a well established principle. A large number of cases
in support of the rule are cited in our original brief,
and additional cases will be found cited under Point IV
hereof.
There could have been no prejudice to the appellant
in the giving of this instruction. The jury could have
well found that the deceased placed himself in a position
of obvious peril and that there was no reasonable justification therefor. In fact, under the evidence we do not
see how the jury could have found any differently. On
such a finding the deceased would have been guilty of
contributory negligence barring any recovery. The fact
that the jury was erroneously advised that this defense
was assumption of risk instead of contributory negligence could not possibly affect the outcome of the litigation.
POINT III.
THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
HOLD THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
TO WARRANT A FINDING THAT ANY NEGLIGENCE
UPON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT'S DRIVER WAS
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.

At the trial of the case, defendants moved for a
directed verdict on the grounds that there was no evidence that any negligence on the part of the defendants
caused the accident, and that the deceased was guilty
of contributory negligence· as a matter of law. If we
were correct in our position on either of these grounds
then there was nothing for the jury to decide and any
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error in instructing the jury would be wholly immaterial,
and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
In our original brief, commencing on page 25, we
atte1npted to point out to the Court that the plaintiff
had wholly failed to sustain the burden of proving that
the deceased's fatal injuries were proximately caused
by any negligence upon the part of the defendant's
driver. Apparently this point has not been considered
by the Court. In the opinion of the court, there is not
so much as a bare recital that the point has been considered and found to be without merit. We do not see
how the Court, with any due consideration to that argument and to the many authorities cited in support thereof, could possibly fail to find merit in the argument.
It would seem that the court should at least take the
time and trouble to point out why it does not follow the
very respectable weight of authority cited in support
of the argument. It is interesting to note that the appellant in his reply brief did not even attempt to answer
this argument. He has not cited so much as a single case
or text book contrary to the position advanced by us.
No rule of law is better settled than that the plaintiff in a personal injury or wrongful death action has
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the accident and the injuries or death resulting therefrom were proximately caused by some neglig~nce chargeable to the defendant. The record in this
case is entirely barren of any evidence which would warrant or support a finding that the fatal injuries sustained by the deceased were caused by any· negligence
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upon the part of the defendant. The only evidence in
the case which in anywise suggests that the defendant's
driver was negligent at all was the testimony of a neighbor of deceased, to the effect that some days after the
accident she heard the driver say to the family of the
deceased that he was not looking. This testimony was
flatly contradicted by the defendants' driver who denied
that he made any such statement, and who testified positively that he was looking straight ahead. However, let
it be assumed that the defendants' driver was not keeping a proper lookout. There is not one shred of evidence
in the record which would warrant a finding that such
failure to keep a proper lookout was a causative factor
in producing this accident. The evidence is all to the
effect that immediately upon his alighting from his
automobile the deceased was struck. There is no evidence
whatsoever that the deceased alighted from his autoInobile sufficiently in advance of the defendants' oncoming truck that the driver of the truck could have, with
the utmost vigilance, avoided the accident. Let it be
remembered by the Court that at the point of impact
the truck was moving away from the station wagon, and
that the impact was not upon the front of the truck but
upon the side of the truck. The evidence points irresistibly and inevitably to the conclusion that the deceased
stepped backward into the truck. It is not the burden
of the defendants in this case to prove freedom from
negligence; rather it is the burden of the plaintiff to
prove negligence and proximate cause. We challenge
counsel for the appellant to point to any place in the
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record where there is any evidence fr01n which a jury
could find that the defendants' driver could have avoided
striking deceased after he alighted from the station
wagon. There is no evidence whatsoever that the deceased alighted from his station wagon sufficiently in
advance of the approach of the defendants' truck that
the defendants' driver could have avoided him in the
exercise of due care. Although the defendant's truck
was not on the n1ain traveled portion of the highway,
it was on the roadway where the driver had a right to
be, and other persons desiring to make use of the roadway had a duty to anticipate his presence and pay heed
to it. We cited in our original brief on pages 28 and 29
many similar cases wherein it was held that there was
no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants.
In addition to the cases there cited we invite the attention
of the Court to the case of Bucilli v. Shanahan, 266 Pa.
342, 109 Atl. 634. See also 2A Blashfield, Cyclopedia of
Automobile Law and Practice, 122, Sec. 1242, where it
is said:
"On the other hand the driver of a motor
vehicle is not ordinarily liable if a pedestrian
without exercising due care for his own safety
suddenly steps into the path of a moving machine
from a place of safety."
~t

In the case of Chipokas v. Peterson, 219 Ia. 1072,

[~
~~

260 N.vV. 37, cited in our original brief at page 28, the
facts are very similar to those of the case at bar. There

0

the defendant was driving twenty to twenty-five miles
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an hour and in the case at bar he was driving twenty
miles per hour. There the plaintiff ran from behind a
parked car whereas here the deceased stepped from
inside a parked car. In neither case did the defendant
ever see the injured pedestrian before the accident.
In the Iowa case the accident occurred in a residential
district. Although the evidence in the case at bar is
not clear on the question, the accident here apparently
occurred in a residential district. In that case the car
was parked one foot from the curb line; in the instant
case there was no curb line but the station wagon was
parked one foot from the sidewalk. In the Chipokas
case the point of impact was about thirteen feet from
the curb. In the instant case the point of impact was
about nine feet from the sidewalk. In holding that there
was no evidence of negligence upon the part of the
defendant the Supreme Court of Iowa said:
"The negligence claimed here is that Peterson failed to maintain a proper look-out and to
have his car under control, and that he violated
an ordinance of the city of Cedar Rapids prohibiting driving of cars in the residential districts
in excess of a speed of 25 miles an hour. Peterson
(defendant) himself testified that he did not see
the child, and this is easily understood, for the
distance from the west curb line of the street to
the spot where the child was struck is a little
more than 13 feet. She either ran in front or in
back of the car that was parked, and this car was
parked about a foot from the curb line. The width
of the car was approximately six feet. This would
take up seven feet of the street, leaving only six
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feet in which this youngster was running when
Peterson caine along. * * * All the other evidence
:shows that Peterson was driving between 20 and
~3 Iniles an hour. r_rrue, he did not sound the horn
or give warning, but there was no reason for
doing so because he did not see the youngster.
And as the child darted out from in front or in
back of the parked car, he had no opportunity
of seeing her. The scene of the accident was not
at a crossing or intersection. Peterson was not
guilty of negligence just because this child, unfortunately, suddenly and unexpectedly ran out
into the path of his auto. This no doubt, was the
view of the jury in the former case, in which the
same evidence was submitted, and in which the
jury returned a verdict in favor of Peterson.
"Peterson had no opportunity to see this child
in time to have prevented this accident. He was
not driving at an excessive speed. * * * The appellant has failed to prove that Peterson was guilty
of negligence. This was one of the essential elements of his case. The lower court was right in
directing the verdict, and the same must be, and
it is hereby, affirmed." (Italics ours).

.,

The language of the Iowa court would appear to be
applicable with equal force to the case at bar .
See also the language of the court in Gavin v. Jacobs,
259 :L\Iass. 23, 155 K.E. 926:
"The evidence in its aspect most favorable
to the plaintiff tended to show that the plaintiff's
intestate, riding on the back of an ice wagon,
dropped off the back of the ice wagon and was
almost immediately struck by the defendant's
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automobile. There is no evidence to support a
finding of negligence on the part of the defendant.
His speed was not excessive, and there is nothing
to indicate that he could have forseen that the
plaintiff's intestate would be in contact with his
automobile. It is manifest also that the accident
could not have occurred if the plaintiff's intestate
had used the care reasonably to be expected of a
child of his years."
POINT IV.
THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
HOLD THAT THE DECEASED WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIHUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW BARRING
ANY RECOVERY IN THIS ACTION.

The point upon which we most strongly rely in this
case is that the deceased was, as a matter of law, guilty
of contributory negligence. So far as appears from the
opinion of the court, this point has been completely overlooked. Commencing at page 30 of our original brief
we cited case after case where it was held under facts
similar to those in the case at bar that the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence barring his recovery.
The rule appears to be universal. In our extensive research on this question we have yet to find a single case
closely similar on its facts wherein a plaintiff has been
permitted to recover where he has stepped from a place
of safety without any observation whatsoever immediately into the path of an oncoming vehicle. Not only
has the rule found universal acceptance by the courts
and text writers, but it has actually been codified in the
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law of this state. Section 57-7-1-l-:2 U.C.A. 19-t-:3, provides,
in part, a~ follows:

"* * * no pedestrian shall suddenly leave a
curb or otl1er place of safety and walk or run
into the path of a vehicle which is so close that
it is in1possible for the driver to yield." (Italics
ours).
The preYailing opinion of the court in the case at
bar closes with this sentence:
'"Although the peril was obvious to anyone
who looked and saw, as did the motorist who
witnessed the tragedy, it seems equally obvious
that the deceased did not look, did not see, did
not appreciate and did not voluntarily place him~
self in the path of a known danger, and hence
could not be charged with assumption of the risk."
(Italics ours).
"\Vith this statement we agree wholeheartedly. We
do not know how the Court could have stated more clearly
or more emphatically that the deceased was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law. Neither
counsel for the appellant nor this Court has suggested
any reason why the rule devolving upon all persons
making use of the highways to observe for other traffic
on the highway should not apply to the deceased in this
case. In his reply brief appellant suggested that the
general rule applied only in commercial districts where
traffic is heavy almost to the point of congestion. N othing could be further from the truth. If this court has
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been mislead by this suggestion, unsupported by either
reason or authority, let us hasten to point out that in
Inany of the cases cited in our original brief the accident
occurred elsewhere than in the business district of a
large city. In Woods v. Moore (Mo. App.), 48 S.W. (2d)
202, cited at page 32 of our original brief, the accident
occurred in a rural district. In Cooper and Co. v. Am.
Can Co., 130 Me. 76, 153 Atl. 889, cited at page "35 of
our brief, the accident occurred in a sparsely settled
section on a country road. In Mingus v. Olsson (Ut.),
201 Pac. (2d) 495, the accident occurred in a residential
section of Salt Lake City. In Deal v. Snyder, 203 :Mich.
273, 168 N.W. 973, cited in our original brief at page
37, the accident occurred in a farming district. In Letts
v. Cole, 310 Pa. 509, 165 Atl. 847, cited in our original
brief at p. 37, the accident occurred in a country borough.
In Koock v. Goodnight (Tex. Civ App.), 71 S.W. (2d)
927, cited at page 38 of our original brief, the accident
occurred on a highway between towns. In Jarvis v.
Stone, 216 Ia. 27, 247 N.W. 393, cited at page 38 of our
original brief, the accident occurred on a road three
miles out of town. In Ponder v. Carroll, 193 Ark. 1120,
105 S.W. (2d) 72, cited in our original brief at page 38,
the accident occurred outside of town. In Rittle v. Zeller,
100 Pa. Sup. Ct. 516, cited at page 38 of our original
brief, the accident occurred in open country. In James
v. Florios, 248 l\lich. 153, 226 N.W. 852, cited in our
original brief at page 28, the accident occurred at the
western city limits of Detroit. In the following addi-
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tional cases the accident occurred other than in the business section of a city:
Heath Y. Klostennan (Pa.), 23 Atl. (2d) 209
(residential district) ;
Hill v. Lappley, 199 :l\Iich. 369, 165 N.W. 657
(country highway);
Gremillion v. Couvillion, 5 La. App. 441 (Church
district);
Yalanda Y. Baum and Reissman, Inc., 113 Fed.
(:2d) 188 (outlying and unbuilt up portion of
borough).
In his reply brief appellant cited Ketchum v. Pattee
(Cal. App.), 98 Pac. (2d) 1051, and Stricklin v. Rosemeyer (Cal. App.), 142 Pac. (2d) 953. Neither case is
helpful to the appellant's position. The basis of the
Ketchum decision was that there was evidence that the
plaintiff was not yet out of the car when the collision
occurred, but was partly in the car and partly on the
running board. The implication of the opinion is that
if the plaintiff had alighted from his car prior to the
occurrence of the accident the holding would be different.
The Stricklin case, insofar as it has any relevance to
the case at bar, supports the position of the respondents
and not that of the appellant. It was there held that
it was proper to instruct that where a person has a
choice of two ways of performing an act, one of which
is safe and the other of which he knows or should know
is subject to danger, and such person chooses the dangerous way and as a proximate result thereof is injured,
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such person is guilty of contributory negligence. The
court said at page 955 :
"On the application of the rule it has been
frequently stated that the 'question' is whether
the plaintiff knew that one way was safe and the
other dangerous and chose the latter with full
knowledge of those conditions. Here the appellant concedes that he had such knowledge and
that the chosen way was in fact dangerous. It is
a matter of common knowledge that sidewalks
are maintained for the safety of pedestrians and
that they are ordinarily less dangerous to the
pedestrians than the traveled portion of vehicle
highways."
In his original brief appellant conceded that it would
have been safer for the deceased to have alighted onto
the sidewalk rather than onto the road. The fact that
deceased was unaware of the approach of defendants'
truck cannot excuse him. The slightest glance to his rear
and the slightest thought for his own safety would have
avoided this accident.
It has also been suggested by counsel for the appellant that the rule of contributory negligence applies only
in the cases of pedestrians attempting to cross a street
from behind cars, but that it finds no application in the
case of persons alighting from parked automobiles
toward the street. It is manifest that counsel has not
examined the authorities. The rule applies with equal
force to persons alighting from automobiles. It is so
laid down in 5 Am. J ur. 610, Automobiles, Sec. 191, cited
at page 30 of our original brief. The case of Will v.
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Boston Elerated Railroad ComJJany, 247 :Mass. 250,
1-!2 N.E. -!-!, cited and discussed at pages 34-35 of our
original brief also involved a pedestrian alighting frmn
an automobile. The facts in that case were very similar
to those in the case at bar. The following additional
cases also involve pedestrians alighting from automobiles, trucks and trolleys :

In Hill v. Lappley, 199 :Mich. 369, 165 N.W. 657,
the plaintiff, a 17 year old woman, descended from the
back of a truck which was parked on the right side of a
country lz iglzway. She looked to the rear before alighting but after alighting, without looking again, she took
three or four steps and was almost instantly struck by
defendant's car. In denying recovery the Supreme Court
of :Jiichigan said :
"It is obvious, I think from all the testimony,
that plaintiff nwst unfortunately stepped into the
highway directly in front of the defendant's car.
The most ordinary care on her part should have
prevented her from so doing. She cannot impose
upon him consequ,ences for which she was in part
responsible." (Italics ours).
In Goff v. Borough of College Hill, 299 Pa. 343,
149 Atl. 477, the plaintiff was injured alighting from an
automobile parked along side the street when he was
struck by a truck approaching from the rear. The court
held plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law. We quote from the opinion of the court
as follows:
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"Goff, a very large man and familiar with
the street, was alighting from his car without
looking for approaching traffic and did not see
either the truck or the Studebaker until the
instant he was struck. Had he glanced to the
south, he would have seen the near approach of
the large truck, so close in line with the left side
of his car as to leave a clearance of not more
than two feet.
"In our opinion plaintiff was guilty of such
contribntory negligence as to bar a recovery
against either defendant. As the automobile traffic upon paved streets is becoming more extensive,
the duty of a party to look before entering a
cartway becomes more important. We have never
departed from the rule stated in Harris v. Commercial Ice Co., 153 Pa. 78, 25 A. 1133, that one
who steps into a busy street, and is immediately
struck by a passing vehicle, which he could have
seen had he looked, cannot recover. * **One who
steps from a vehicle into the cartway of a busy
street regardless of the condition of approaching
traffic therein is negligent. * * * What plaintiff
did in the present case, was not to step from the
curb into the cartway, but to step therein from
the street side of his car. * * * We do not doubt
his right to alight from his car into the street,
but before doing so it was his duty to look for
approaching vehicles. Here, plaintiff could have
seen the near approach of the large truck; coming
along so close as to clear his car by only two
feet, and stepping down so near in its path was
negligence." (Italics ours).

In Bucilli v. Shanahan, 266 Pa. 342, 109 Atl. 634,
the deceased stepped from the left side of a truck
parked along the right hand curb and was immediately
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struck and killed by the defendants' truck. The court
held there was no evidence of neglect on the part of
defendants and added that the deceased's own contributory negligence barred recovery. To the same effect see
Hall v. Freaney, 3-!5 Pa. -l5, 26 Atl. (2d) 45-l; also
ralanda v. Bmun and Reissman, Inc., 113 Fed. (2d) 188.
A case very similar on its facts to the case at bar
is Heath v. Klosterman (Pa.), 23 Atl. (2d) 209. The
facts were stated in the opinion of the court as follows:
"The accident happened in broad daylight

* * * immediately in front of Dr. Heath's (deceased's) residence. * * * The house was on the
right side of the highway, * * * the doctor's auto,
headed in the same direction, was then parked in
front of his house. Dr. Heath was in the act of
alighting from its left door or had just stepped
down upon the road, when he was struck by a
truck owned and operated by one Charles R.
:Jiartin. According to 1\;lartin, who was the only
eye witness produced by plaintiff, the door of
the car suddenly swung open and the doctor stepped out when the truck was almost up to the rear
wheel of his auto, and he was struck almost
instantly. Martin said he was then driving at
approximately 20 miles an hour."
In denying recovery the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said:

"The testimony leads to the inevitable conclusion, that the real cause of the unfortunate
accident was the heedless act of Dr. Heath himself. As shown by positive proof produced by
plaintiff, the door of his car was suddenly pushed
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open and he stepped into the roadway of this
much traveled boulevard without thought or care
of traffic. The Martin truck was almost upon him
at that nwment and he was struck almost instantaneously. Had he only looked before leaving his
car in this manner, he would have seen the two
trucks and he could have avoided the accident.
Where a person steps into a position of danger
in the street, and is immediately struck by a passing vehicle, which he could have seen had he looked, he is barred from recovery by his own negligence. [Citations omitted]. Even though Dr.
Heath is dead and ordinarily a presumption might
arise that he exercised due care, this presumption
is destroyed in the instant case by the testimony
adduced by plaintiff. * ~ * This conclusively appeared in the presentation of plaintiff's own case,
for the evidence established that Dr. Heath did
not look. Moreover, the accident having happened
in broad daylight, he must have seen the trucks
had he looked before stepping out. There can be
no presumption as against facts which are proven.
* =II< *
"\Ve are forced to conclude that Dr. Heath
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. * * * What Dr. Heath did in the instant
case was not to step from the curb into the cartway, but to step therein from the street side of
his auto, totally oblivious of traffic then approaching him. * * *While a person has a right to alight
from his auto onto the cartway, it is his duty to
look and continue to look for approaching traffic
when doing so. He must exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances. For a person to place
himself suddenly in the cartway of a busy highway, with on-coming traffic close by, where a
false step by him or a slight deviation of the
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course of a vehicle n1ight cause his serious injury
or death, eonstitutes eonduct that can only be
regarded as being grossly careless and negligent.
,. ,. ,. r nquestionably the conduct of Dr. Heath
eontributed Inaterially to the accident, and, * * *
we are bound to enter judgment for defendant."
The following language frmn the Supreme Court
of \Yisconsin in the case of Brickell v. Tredwr, 176 \Vis.
557, 186 K.\Y. 593, is applicable with equal force to the
facts in the case at bar:
"rpon any conceivable construction of the
evidence, the plaintiff had ample and unobstructed opporhmity to discover the defendant's car
in tin1e to have avoided the injury. She could
have discovered the on-coming car as soon as the
defendant could have discovered her. If the defendant was guilty of negligence in not discovering plaintiff before she did, the plaintiff was also
guilty of negligence in not discovering the car
of defendant before it was within five feet of her.
From this conclusion we can see no escape."
(Italics ours).
See also the language of the court in Levesque v.
Dumont, 116l\Ie. 25, 99 Atl. 719:
"We are satisfied from a careful examination
of the evidence that plaintiff's intestate at the
time of the accident was not in the exercise of
such care as ordinarily careful boys of his age
and intelligence are accustomed to exercise under
like circumstances. He started to cross a public
city street frequented by teams and autos. Had
he looked up the street, he must have seen the
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car approaching, and, had he been attentive, he
must have seen the lights projecting their rays
by the rear of the team in season to have avoided
his peril. Heedlessly he passed into the path of
the car, so near to it that the accident could not
be avoided."
In Tolmie v. Woodward Taxicab Co., 178 Mich. 426,
144 N. W. 855, the court said:
"Under the conditions described by himself,
with good eyesight and his wits about him, it
seems impossible that plaintiff could not have
seen the danger in time to avoid it, had he been
reasonably alert and used his eyes and ears as
the average reasonably prudent and cautious man
should and would under like circumstances, and
as his companions did. Instead of showing absence of contributory negligence, his evidence
shows its presence.

* * * *
"Here, under the undisputed conditions surrounding the accident and eliminating all issues
of fact which conflicting evidence raises, plaintiff's own testimony shows that he failed to use
his senses and exercise that reasonable degree
of care to avoid injury, proportionate to the circumstances which the law makes essential to
recovery, and by his own carelessness and negHgence contributed to the same."
In the case of Pomeroy v. Dykema, 256 :Mich. 100,
239 N.W. 342, the defendant, proceeding along the street,
turned to the left to pass around a truck parked against
the right hand curb in such fashion that it protruded
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nearly to the center line of the street. After clearing the
truck defendant turned again to the right and struck
the deceased who was attmnpting to cross the street
from behind the parked truck. The defendant did not
realize he had struck a pedestrian until he was so advised
by a passenger in his car. As in the instant case the
marks of impact were on the right side of the defendant's
car rather than on the front. The court held the deceased
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
saying:
"Careful consideration of the record convinces us that plaintiff's decedent attempted to
cross the street, and in passing opposite the parked truck he walked or ran into the side of defendant's car, and in so doing he was guilty of contributory negligence."
In the case of Oldroyd v. W. W. Kirby & Son, 317
Pa. 220, 176 Atl. 203, the plaintiff stepped from in front
of a trolley car and into the side of defendant's passing
truck. The court held plaintiff guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law and said:
"It was clear daylight, and, if appellant had
been looking, he must have seen and avoided contact with the passing machine; his failure to look
was, as a matter of law, contributory negligence."
A similar case_ is MacDiarmid Candy Co. v. Schwartz,
110. App. 303.
In the case of Cooper v. American Can Co., 130 Me.
76, 153 Atl. 889, the court used this language:
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"Under the rule requiring every user of the
highway to exercise reasonable care for his own
safety and protection * * *, a pedestrian crossing
or about to cross a street or highway when his
view of an approaching motor vehicle is obstructed, is usually required to exercise a greater
degree of care than would under other circumstances be necessary * * *, and is negligent if he
fails to take proper precautions to discover and
observe the approach of such vehicle before placing himself in a position of danger. [Citations]

* * ..

"And the question of contributory negligence
1nust be determined without regard to any negligence on the part of defendant. Giving to plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is legally
entitled, and resolving every reasonable inference
which may be drawn therefrom in favor of plaintiff, the inevitable conclusion must be that Mr.
Crosby negligently left his place of safety in
the obscurity of the loaded truck and stepped
directly into the path of the moving auto."
Afiler citing and discussing many of the cases on the
question here under discussion, the court concluded as
follows:
"In the case at bar the injured person was
a man of 65 years, in the full possession of his
faculties.
"In the light of all the circumstances, and
with the law as expressed herein, we cannot predicate· the jury verdict on sound premises. The
pedestrian was negligent, even to the degree of
exercising no care for his safety. His negligence
continued up to the moment of impact, and, as in
Levesque v. Dumont, recovery is barred."
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See also the language of the court in Deal v. Snyder,
203 :\Iich. 273, 168 N.W. 973:
"When plaintiff admits that the slightest
glance upon his part would have averted the accident, the law cannot aid him, even against one
who is concededly negligent."
The language of the court in Doyle v. Boston Elevated Ry., 2-±S Mass. 89, 142 N.E. 693, is also applicable
to the case at bar :
"The undisputed, indisputable e·vidence coming from and binding the plaintiff brings this
case within the rule laid down where the person
injured has stepped from behind of an object in
a street in front of another, either without looking or listening. The law is established that on
such evidence as is here presented the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is proved as a
matter of law, and it is the duty of the court to
direct a verdict for the defendant."

~

Pedestrians and motorists have equal rights to the
use of the highway and both must use them with regard
to the rights of the other. The rule is stated by Blashfield
as follows :

~

1

)

"In other words, motorists and pedestrians
have the same rights to the use of the street or
highway, and both are bound to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and must exercise their
rights with due regard to the rights of the other."
Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, Section 1241.
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The rule has been rcognized and followed in this
state.
In Mingus v. Olsson (Ut.), 201 Pac. (2d) 495, this
court said:
"The rights of pedestrians to the use of the
public streets are the same as those of motorists
-neither greater nor less. Hence, the same general duties devolve upon them. A pedestrian
crossing a public street in a crosswalk or pedestrian lane, although he may have the right of way
over vehicular traffic, nonetheless has the dut~·
to observe for such traffic. Clearly, decedent
neglected that duty in this case. It follows that
he was contributorily negligent as a matter of
law. Of course we do not mean to imply that a
mere glance in the direction of the approaching
automobile would suffice. The duty to look has
inherent in it the duty to see what is there to be
seen, and to pay heed to it."
We also invite the attention of the Court to the
excellent discussion of the rule, particularly as it pertains to cases having facts like those in the case at bar,
in Huddy, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, 9th Ed. Yols.
5 and 6, Sec. 74, p. 119, Sees. 88 and 89, pp. 154 and 155.
We quote as follows :
Sec. 74, page 119: "Pedestrians have equal
rights on streets and highways, with automobiles,
and, when using the highway, must exercise reasonable care for their own safet~·, that is to say,
the pedestrian must use such care for his ovvn
safety as a reasonably prudent man would exercise under the same circumstances."
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~er. SS, page 15-!: .. If a pedestrian walks or
runs against a 1noving autmnobile whieh is readily
obserYa.ble, it n1ay be taken for granted that he
did not see the car. On this assumption, he is
guilty of negligence either (1) because he did
not look for approaching automobiles or (2)
because, if he looked, his observation was so
careless and inattentive that he did not see the
car in question."
Page 155 : '·One who suddenly places himself
immediately in front of a 1noving automobile
which is readily observable is generally guilty of
negligence per se."
Sec. 89, page 155: "The rule· requiring a
pedestrian to look for approaching automobiles
applies where a person alighting from another
vehicle steps into the roadway. If he fails to
look for approaching cars or fails to observe
them, he cannot as a rule recover for InJuries
inflicted by a car running into him."

It appears from the opinion of the Court that it is
convinced from its study of the record that the deceased
did not look and did not see. It follows as a necessary
consequence under the well established law that the
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence which
bars any recovery by the plaintiff for his death. No
valid reason has been suggested and none occurs to us
as to why this result should not follow. Our State Legislature has specifically provided that no pedestrian shall
suddenly step from a place of safety into the path of
an approaching automobile. The reason for the rule
appears to be patent enough. Without statutory pro~
vision, it has been followed as the rule of decision by
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practically every appellate court in the United States.
Even in the absence of a legislative mandate there would
appear to be no reason why this Court should not also
adhere to the rule. It has the judicial sanction of many
of the most respected courts of the land and also of
leading text writers in the field. If for some obscure
reason the rule is not to be followed in this state it would
seem that this Court should by clear opinion so advise
the trial bench and bar so that other courts and lawyers
will not be led into error.
CONCLUSION
The court has failed to decide all of the issues of
law presented on appeal. The Court erroneously held
that the instruction on assumption of risk was prejudicial
error. The Court likewise committed error in failing
to hold that the plaintiff had failed to sustain the burden
of proving that the death of deceased proximately resulted from negligence imputable to the defendants.
The Court particularly erred in failing to hold that
the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons the respondents are entitled to a rehearing, and upon rehearing being granted,
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN &
CHRISTENSEN,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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